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IX THE DISTRICT COFnrr OF 'J1 HE FIFTll 
.JuDJCIAL DI8TRlCT JN AND FOR 'I_'HE 
COUNTY OF \VASHIN'GTOX, STATE OF "CTAH 
St. George and Washington Canal 
Comp2.ny, a corporation, 
vs. 
Hurricane Canal Company, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff 
STIPULATION. 
Defendant. 
It is stipulated and agreed by and between the St. George and 
Washington Canal Company, Plaintiff, and by the Hurricane Canal 
Company, Defendant, and by the La Verkin Bench Canal Company, 
an interested party, in the above case: 
1. That during the period of low water none of the waters oi 
Ash Creek rising above the Town of Toquerville, enters or forms a 
part of the Rio Virgen. 
2. That during the period of low water, none of the waters of the 
East Fork of the Rio Virgen, rising above Mount Carmel, in Kane 
County, reaches that part of the Rio Virgen in Washington County. 
so as to be available for irrigation purposes in said County. 
3 And it is further stipulated, that the Decree determining the 
water rights of the parties at interest in the waters of the Rio 
Virgen, so far as the above waters are concei·ned, may be entered 
in a~ordance with this stipulation? 
In Witness whereof, the said Compan?Jes have hereunto attached 
their names, and affixed their official seals this 2nd day of April. 
1925. 
FILED 
Fifth Judicial District Court 
Washington Co11nty, Utah 
April 4, 1925 
/s/ William Brooks 
Clerk 
St. George and Washington Canal Co. 
By /s/ Richard A. Morris 
President 
Hurricane Canal Company 
By /fl/ James W. Imlay 
President 
LaVerken Bench Canal Company 
By /s/ Samuel Webb, Pres. 
Source: Exhibit 2, file marked "1919-1935, exhibits, counterclai.ms. 
etc." Burton Decree proceedings. Case No. 270, Washwg· 
ton County. 
This file is divided by years. The foregoing document appears as 
page 1 immediately following the 1925 index. 
Appendix page vi 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
St. George & Washington Canal Co., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Hurricane Canal Co., a corporation, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
This case came on regularly for hearing at St. George, Wash-
ington County, Utah, April 10, 1925, after due notice to all parties 
and all parties objecting to the State Engineer's proposed determi-
nation having either appeared personally in court or by stipulation 
filed herein, and all parties consented that the court render its 
decree in accordance with the proposed determination of the State 
Engineer filed herein as amended and corrected by said stipulation 
with the exception of that of the Virgin Canal Company, Virgin, 
Utah, who objected to the amount of water allowed from Blue 
Springs to Robert A. Thorley of Cedar City, Utah, page 15, State 
Engineer's proposed determination. 
It appears from the petition filed herein that the State Engineer 
and his assistants have worked earnestly to get a stipulation be-
tween the above named parties but have been unable to do so. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 
I. 
That this objection come for hearing before this court the 26 
day of October 1925, at 2 p.m. 
* * 
* * 
Dated Oct. 9, 1925 
/s/ Thos H. Burton 
Judge 
Source: Exhibit 2, file marked "1919-1935, answers, counterclaims, 
etc." Burton Decree proceedings, case No. 270, Washington 
County. Page 8 following 1925 index. 
Appendix Page vii 
IN THE DTSTIUCT COUH11 OF' '11 HE FIFTH 
JFDICIAL DTSTHIC'L' lN AND FOR T !TE 
COUl\TY OF \YASHIXGTON, S'l'A'I'E OF ll'l'A!I 
St. George & \Vashington Canal Co., 
a corporation, l Plaintiff, vs. PETITION Hurricane Canal Co., a corporation, Defendant. J 
Comes now George M. Bacon, the duly appointed, qualified and 
acting State Engineer of the State of Utah and shows the Court: 
I. 
T~rnt this case came on regularly for hearing at St. George. 
Washington County, Utah, Dec. 12, 1925, after due notice to all 
parties, and all parties objecting to the State Engineer's proposed 
determination having either appeared personally in court or by 
stipulation filed heren, and all parties consented that the court 
render its decree in accordance with the proposed determination of 
the State Engineer filed herein as amended and corrected by said 
stipulation ·with the exception of that of the Virgin Canal Co., Vil" 
gin. Utah, who objected to the amount of water allowed from Blue 
Springs to Robert A. Thorley of Cedar City, Utah, page 15, State 
Engineer's proposed determination. 
IV. 
That the determination of the State Engineer, as amended and 
co1 rected by the stipulations, gives the amount of water which is to 
be allowed to each of the parties of this suit in cubic feet per second 
and acre feet divided into classes 1, 2 and 3."H' 
* ~+ 
Geo. M. Bacon 
State Engineer 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of October 1926. 
My Commission Expires: 
April 15, 1928 
D. H. Morris 
Notary Public 
Residence: St. George, Utah 
FILED 
Fifth Judicial District Court 
Washington County, Utah 
October 21, 1926 
William J. Brooks, Clerk 
By Laura A. Gates 
Deputy Clerk 
Source: Exhibit 2, file marked "1919-1935, answers, counterclaim-' 
etc." Burton Decree proce2dings, Case No. 270, WashiM· 
ton County. Pages 2-4 following 1926 index. 
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IN 'l1 HE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF vVASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH 
St. George & Washington Canal Co., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ORDER 
Hurricane Canal Co., a corporation, 
Defendant. 
This case came on regularly for hearing at St. George, Wash-
ington County, Utah, Dec. 12, 1925, after due notice to all parties, 
and all parties objecting to the State Engineer's Proposed Determi-
nation having either appeared personally in court or by stipulation 
filed herein, and all parties consented that the court render its 
decree in accordance with the proposed Determination of the State 
Engineer filed herein as amended and corrected by said stipulations, 
with the exception of that of the Virgin Canal Co., Virgin, Utah, who 
objected to the amount of water allowed from Blue Springs to 
Robert A. Thorley of Cedar City, Utah, page 15, State Engineer's 
proposed determination, which objections were thereupon heard 
and disposed of, and it appearing from a statement of the State 
Engineer that in making his determination in this suit costs amount-
ing to $4456.35 were incurred, which costs were necessary and 
properly incurred in making said determination, and having shown 
lhe court that it is necessary that this sum of money be repaid to 
the State Engineer for use in connection with the adjudication of 
water rights on other streams as provided by law, 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 
x- -:+ [costs are apportioned among decreed owners] 
Thos. H. Burton 
Dated: Oct 27-1926 
Judge 
FILED 
In Fifth Judicial District Court 
Washington County, Utah 
November 3, 1926 
William Brooks, Clerk 
By Laura A. Gates 
Source: Exhibit 2, file marked "1919-1935, answers, counterclaims, 
etc." Burton Decree proceedings, case No. 270, Washing-
ton County. Pages 6, 7 following 1926 index. 
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SCHEDFLE OF \YA'l'ERS A WARDJ•=D THREE :MAJOR USERS UNDER 
"I\lC CARTY" DECREE AS CO:MPAR~D Wl11 H "BPRTON-COX" DECREE 
MC CARTY DECREE 
(Divided Entire East Fork 
into 1,201-1/3 shares 
without preference) 
BURTON-COX DECREE 
[Awarded to all "Class 1" 
Distributes Water Based 
on Volume of Flow (c.f.s.)] 
TOT AL SHARES AWARDED THREE MAJOR USERS TOT AL C.F.S. AWARDED 
434-1/3 GLENDALE IRRIGATION COMPANY 7.23 
265-1/2 ORDERVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY 4.42 
404-5/6 l\'IT. CARMEL IRRIGATION COMPANY 
1,104-2/3 SHARES TOT AL AW ARDS TO THREE MAJOR USERS 
1,104-2/3 /434-1/3 = 39.3% 
1,104-2/3 /265-1/2 = 23.9% 
1,104-2/3 /404-5/6 = 36.8% 
100.0% 
PERCENTAGES OF AGGREGATE AWARDS 
TO THE THREE MAJOR USERS: 
GLENDALE IRRIGATION COMP ANY 
ORDERVILLE IRRIGATION COMPANY 
MT. CARMEL IRRIGATION COMPANY 
Appendix page x 
6.58 
C.F.S. 18.23 
18.23 /7.23 = 39.6% 
18.23 /4.42 = 24.3% 
18.23 /6.58 = 36.1 % 
100.0% 
In the Supreme Court 
of the State of IJtall 
ORDERVILLE IRRIGATIONF 
COMPANY, a corporation; MT. 
CARMEL IRRIGATION COMPA-
NY, a corporation; HENRY CAR-
ROLL, MERRILL MacDONALDJ-_ _..__.~ .• ~.:: 
HOWARD SPENCER, LYLE 
CHAMBERLAIN, M. G. HOL-
GATE, GRANT HEATON, FRED 
MAJOR, DUKE AIKEN and DUN;.·, ' 
CAN MacDONALD, 
Plaintif/.'J and Res~,">· 
-~. .:/· 
VB. •«I;. •t 
GLENDALE IRRIGATION ce.~. 
PANY, and WAYNE D. ClllJ)l) 
Utah State· Engineer, 
Defendants aM, A,>,ei~ .. t-' 
: ,.~ 1: ~~ 
APPELL\' 
ON APPEAL FROM THB' 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTlUC'r 
UTAH, IN AND FOR 
' '•' <¢;' 
HONORABLE FJilBDDll'..QU> . 
cuN:m An 
By&. 
Milf~ .. '. 
Attontlp. 
Glendee 1 
DALLill w. J 
Salt Lab · 
Attor•6'J /.ff..:, 
Wagflie· D. 
OLSEN ANID CHAMBERLAIN 
Richfield, Utah, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents 
. ' 
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COMPANY, a corporation; MT. 
CARMEL IRRIGATION COMPA-
NY, a corporation; HENRY CAR-
ROLL, MERRILL MacDONALD, 
HOWARD SPENCER, LYLE 
CHAMBERLAIN, M. G. HOL-
GATE, GRANT HEATON, FRED 
MAJOR, DUKE AIKEN and DUN-
CAN MacDONALD, 
Plaintiffs anrl RPspondents, 
vs. 
GLENDALE IRRIGATION COM-
PANY, and WAYNE D. CRIDDLE, 
Utah State Engineer, 
Defenda11ts and Appdlaut.~ 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
Case No. 10325 
STATEMENT OF rrnE KIND OF GASE 
This rase is one involving the respective priorities 
of water rights belonging to plaintiffs and respondents 
and the Glendale Irrigation Company, defendant and 
on0 of the appc·llnnts. 
2 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Summary judgment was granted by the Honorable 
Ferdinand Erickson, Judge of the District Court in and 
for Kane County, Utah, in favor of the plaintiffs, grant-
ing the relief asked for in the amended complaint. 
RmLIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This appeal is taken jointly by the defendants Glen-
dale Irrigation Company and the State Engineer, for a 
determination by this Honorable Court reversing the 
said summary judgment and remitting this cause to the 
District Court with a mandate to grant the defendant's 
motion for a summary judgment; or in the event it is 
determined the defendants are not entitled to a summary 
judgment, that the case be remitted back to the District 
Court for a trial on the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs are Orderville Irrigation Company, a cor-
poration, Mt. Carmel Irrigation Company, a corpora-
tion, and a number of individuals claiming water rights 
on the East Fork of the Virgin River located in Kane 
County. Defendant Glendale Irrigation Company, a cor-
poration, also has a water right on the East Fork of 
the Virgin River. 
All of these water rights are set forth as Awards 
Nos. 1 to 30-B in the printed Virgin River System De· 
3 
aee; and on pages 64 to 69 inclusive in the supplemental 
and final decree-File marked August 10, 1935, of origi-
nal adjudication files, and file marked 1930-1932 ''Sup-
plemental and Final Decree'' pages 2 to 10 inclusive. 
The plaintiffs commenced this action for a judg-
ment declaring that the McCarty Decree, dated the 18th 
day of April, 1900, made and entered in the case of Mt. 
Carmel Irri.oation Company, et al., vs. Joseph Hopkins; 
et al., (Kane County) should prevail over the decree in 
the case of St. George and 'Vashing-ton Canal Company, 
a corp., plaintiffs, vs. Hurricane Canal Company, a cor-
poration, defendants. This latter case was one adjudi-
cating all of the waters on the Virgin River System. 
The first decree in this general adjudication suit is dated 
December 12, 1925, signed by Thos. H. Burton, Judge, 
and is commonly called the Burton Decree. A final de-
cree is dated the 21st day of April, 1931, signed by Le-
Roy H. Cox, Judge, and is sometimes referred to as the 
Cox Decree. 
The water rights of the plaintiffs in the case at bar 
were rights involved in the old McCarty Decree of 1900; 
and which decree makes no mention of priorities as be-
tween the water users but recites that the parties are 
entitled to and are the owners of certain proportions 
of the stream. In both the general adjudication decrees 
of 1925 and the final decree of 1931, the priorities of the 
plaintiff corporations are found in awards as follows: 
4 
Orderville Irrigation Co. award No. 21, priority 
date 1871. 
Mt. Carmel Irrigation Co. award No. 22, prioritv 
date 1870. 
The priorities of the plaintiff individuals or their 
predecessors in interest, together 'vith the prioritieR of 
many other water users on the East Fork of the Virgin 
River are founu in the general adjudication decrees of 
the Virgin River in awards Nos. 1 to and including 30A, 
with one right as early as 1865, one at 1867, a few at 
1870, and a large number at 1890 and thereafter. 
The priority of the defendant Glendale Irrigation 
Company is set at 1865. 
These priorities were determined in the said general 
adjudication decrees strictly in accordance with the wat-
er users' claims filed with the court. (Burton Decree Ex-
hibit 1, vVater Users' claims Nos. 1 through 30A). (Also 
original water users' claims-Defendants' Ex. 1). 
(Note: In this brief whenever reference is made to 
the ''Burton Decree'' it is intended to ref er to the first 
decree of 1925 in the general adjudication proceedings 
of the Virgin River System; and when reference is 
made to the "Cox Decree" it is intended to refer to the 
final decree of 1931). 
In the case at bar the court granted plaintiffs' mo-
tjon for a summary judgment which in effect decreed 
that the prior McCarty Decree must supercede and prr-
5 
vail over the latter general adjudication decrees, to the 
end that the priorities of the water rights of the plain-
tiffs and the defendant Glendale Irrigation Company in 
the later general adjudication decrees are set aside and 
held for naught, and all of such rights are entitled to 
an equal or common priority. 
From such judgment and decree this appeal has 
been taken by the defendant irrigation company and 
the State Engineer. 
In the years 1956 and 1961, after some inquiries 
made by the plaintiffs or some of them to the State En-
gineer concerning priorities, the State Engineer issued 
his orders to the water commissioner to distribute the 
water according to the Burton and Cox Decrees (Tr. 59). 
In October, 1961, respondents filed their complaint 
in the District Court of Kane County, Utah, attached a 
copy of the McCarty Decree dated April 18, 1900, and 
pleaded in substance that the McCarty Pecree estab-
lished the water rights therein mentioned without regard 
to any priority date as between the parties thereto (Tr. 
1 to 8 inc.). It is then pleaded that the McCarty Decree 
was administered and followed from the date of its 
entry and including the present time without regard to 
any priorities. It is also pleaded that the priorities of 
the various plaintiffs is equal or superior to the pri-
ority date of the defendant irrigation company (Tr. 2). 
Later and in May, 1964, an amended complaint was 
6 
filed dismissing one Chas. Anderson as a defendant 
and deleting all reference to any fraud having been per-
petrated against the plaintiffs under which the defend-
ant irrigation company procured an earlier priority 
than that a;warded the plaintiffs (Tr. 26-33). This 
amended complaint alleges: 
'' * * * that as a result of some language in 
the Burton and Cox Decrees the defendant Glen-
dale Irrigation Company contends, and the Statr 
Engineer has ruled and so administered the strearn, 
that the defendant Glendale Irrigation Company 
has been awarded a priority date superior to and 
earlier than those priority dates of the plaintiffs 
,,, '' * Tr. 28) ". 
It is also alleged that neither the Burton Decree 
nor the Cox Decree was ever intended to provide any 
priority date superior to any other priority date estab-
lished for a user on the East Fork of the Virgin River 
* * * and that ''the Burton and Cox Decrees must be 
interpreted to establish an equal priority date in each 
of the plaintiffs and defendant Glendale Irrigation Com-
pany" (Tr. 28-29). 
The complaint alleges a damage of $10,000.00 be-
cause (by order of the State Engineer) they were de-
prived of some water in the years 1961 and 1962 through 
the enforcement of the general adjudication decrees (Tr. 
29). 
In essence the plaintiffs are asking that the gen-
eral adjudication decrees, although standing undisturbed 
7 
for between 35 and 40 years, should now be disregarded 
and a decree entered at this late date amending the 
prior ones by enlarging upon some rights and reducing 
others. 
The State Engineer filed his answer to the amended 
romplaint admitting that the McCarty Decree did not 
designate the priority of water rights by specific dates; 
denying that the McCarty Decree states the f}nantity of 
water that a share represented; and admitting that he 
ordered the water commissioner to administer water of 
the East :F'ork according to the general adjudication de-
crees (Tr. 39-40). The defendant Glendale Irrigation 
Company answered, pleading several defenses, to-wit: 
1. That the amended complaint fails to state a claim 
against the defendant upon which relief can be granted. 
2. That the action, as against the defendant, is 
barred by the provisions of Sect,ion 78-12-26(.3) U.C.A. 
1958, and also barred by the provision of Scrtion 78-12-
23, U.C.A. 1.95.'l. 
3. That the action is barred by the doctrines of 
latches and unreasonable delay in bringing the action. 
4. That on or about the 12th day of December, 1925, 
the District Court of \¥ ashington County, in the said 
general adjudication proceedings, Civil No. 270, made 
and entered its decree in which the water rights of the 
plaintiffs and defendants were adjudicated as to period 
of lHH', volume of flow, acreages and respectiYe priori-
8 
ties; that on or about the 21st day of April, 1931, in the 
said cause the District Court made and entered its sup-
plemental and final decree, again setting up the respec-
tive awards, among others, of plaintiffs and defendant, 
or their respective predecessors in interest; that the 
parties to said decrees were dnly and regularly advised 
and notified of the respective priorities being a:wardccl 
to the various water users, and were duly advised and 
notified of the entry of the decree and its contents; that 
the appeal period expired in 1931; that no appeal was 
taken therefrom by any of the plaintiffs or their predr-
cessors in interest; that the said decree has long since 
become final and ever since its finality has been and 
now does remain in full force and effect and its terms 
and provisions are res judicata; that the plaintiffs are 
now estopped from setting up or claiming any rights to 
water, particularly as to priorities different than as set 
forth in said decree. 
5. A general denial of the allegations of the amend-
ed complaint, excepting an admission as to the existence 
of the McCarty Decree and its contents (rrr. 34 to 3fi 
inc.). 
Defendant Glendale Irrigation Company served and 
filed its motion for summary judgment and iu support 
of the motion defendant ref erred to the pleadings and to 
portions of the files and proceedings, including the wat-
er users' claims filed in the Virgin River general ad-
judication decree. These portions of the files and pro-
9 
ceedings were theretofore introduced and admitted in 
evidence in a pre-trial of the cause and a hearing upon 
the defendants' motion for a summary judgment (Tr. 
41-42). This motion for a summary judgment has never 
been either granted or denied, except insofar as the 
later granting of plaintiffs' motion for summary judg-
ment implies the denial of defendants' motion. 
Some short time later the plaintiffs filed their mo-
tion for a summary judgment (Tr. 43-44) 
After at least one pre-trial hearing, without any 
pre-trial order ever having been ordered or made, and 
on the 11th day of September, 1963, the defendant irri-
gation company filed its affidavit of bias and prejudice 
and certificate of good faith, asking that the Hon. Fer-
dinand Erickson, Judge of the District Court of the 
Sixth Judicial District, disqualify himself as the trial 
judge in this case (Tr. 63-4-5). Judge Erickson ques-
tioned the legal sufficiency of the affidavit and entered 
an order certifying the affidavit to Judge C. Nelson 
Day (Tr. 66), who thereafter filed a memorandum de-
cision referring the matter back to Judge Erickson (Tr. 
GG-70). In this memo decision Judge Day sets forth in 
part: 
''This action was brought for the determina-
tion of certain water rights under or in connection 
with prior decrees of the District Court of the 
State of Utah. There had been pre-trial hearings 
and also hearings on motions for summary judg-
10 
ment; however there has been no trial of the case . 
.. At that state of the proceedings there had been 
some meeting of the litigants at which none of the 
counsel appeared but where the District Court 
Judge appeared and there was some informal 
discussion between the Judge and such litigants. 
It was following such meeting and at least partly 
as a result thereof that the said affidavit was 
filed herein" (Tr. 67). 
After interrogatories were served and answered and 
depositions taken by the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs on June 
10, 1964, filed a further motion for summary judgment 
(Tr. 76-77). 
On November 5, 1964, Judge Erickson signed a 
memo of decision (Tr. 139-151); and on January 15, 
1965, there were filed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (Tr. 152-160), and a summary judgment and de-
cree (Tr. 161-164 ). 
POINTS URGED FOR REVERSAJ~ 
1. That the court erred in not granting the summary 
judgment made and filed by the defendants. 
2. That the court erred in granting the plaintiffs' 
motion for a summary judgment. 
3. That the court erred in not disqualifying himself 
as the trial judge upon the filing of the affidavit of bias 
and prejudice and filing of the statutory certificate. 
4a. That the answers to the interrogatories and the 
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depositions, together with the exhibits admitted and re-
ceived in evidence do not jus.tify the granting of a sum-
mary judgment in favor of plaintiffs; 
4b. That the court erred in making its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and that the pleadings, 
answers to interrogatories and the depositions do not 
support such Findings and Conclusions. 
4c. That the court erred in making and entering 
the summary judgment and decree. 
5. The trial court erred in ordering the State En-
gineer to distribute the waters of the East Fork of the 
Virgin River in accordance with the McCarty Decree 
and not the Burton-Cox Decree. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT MADE AND FILED BY THE 
DEFENDANTS. 
It is obvious that the plaintiffs should not prevail 
upon the alleged cause of action pleaded in their amend-
ed complaint-this for any number of reasons, any one 
of which is sufficient to bar plaintiffs' right to the re-
lief prayed for. 
The facts pleaded in the amended complaint, to-
g-ether with the factual situation shown by the files in 
the general adjudication proceeding involving the waters 
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of the Virgin Ri\'er, conclusively show that the plaintiffs 
and/ or their predecessors in interest filed their respec-
tive water users' claims setting up their priorities aR 
claimed by them (Defts Ex. No. 1, Claims No. 1 through 
No. 30A). All of the claims of the plaintiffs show pri-
orities later than the 1865 of the defendant Glendale Ir-
rigation Company. Based upon such water users' claims, 
and after a consideration of objections and protests and 
hearings thereon, and, it must he assumed, upon com-
petent evidence, the Court on December 12, 1925, made 
and entered a decree (printed decree entered by Thos. 
H. Burton, Judge, dated Dec. 12, 1925, on file in office 
of State Engineer). 
This decree held open the Court's jurisdiction to 
correct errors, etc., and on April 21, 1931, the Court 
made and entered its final decree (Defts. Ex. No. J, 
File Marked 1930 and 1932). 
In both the first and the later final decrees the re-
spective priorities are distinctly set forth. 
No appeal from the final decree waR taken by any 
of the plaintiffs. 
The summary judgment should have been granted 
on the basis of the defendant Glendale Irrigation Corn-
pany 's fourth defense as pleaded in its answer to the 
amended complaint (Tr. 36), which is the defens<:> of 
res judicata. 
This defense pleads that the Cox Decree of 10:11 
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became final in that year and no appeal having been 
taken, is now res judicata; that after this long lapse 
of time plaintiffs are now estopped from attacking the 
decree. 
In the case of Huntsville Irr. Assn. vs. District Court 
' 
72 Utah 431, 270 Pac. 1090, this Court held that a gen-
eral adjudication proceeding was not a determination of 
rights to the use of water as between claimants and 
users on one side and the State of Utah on the other, 
but was a determination of rights to the use of water 
as between and among the clairnants and users them-
selves. The Court in that case held: 
"Sections 2 to 28, inclusive, of Chapter 67, 
Session Laws of Utah, 1919, present a compre-
hensive plan for the determination of water rights 
pertaining to a river system. rrhe form of action 
was evidently intended to apply where many per-
sons claim rights to the use of water from such 
source of supply. One of the purposes of the 
statute was to prevent piecemeal litigation in the 
determination of water rights and determine them 
all in one action * * * Another purpose of the 
statute, evidently, was to make a permanent rec-
ord of such rights by decree of court instead of 
permitting the evidence to rest in parol. The 
statute, as before stated, provides that the claim 
filed by the claimants shall stand in the place of 
pleadings and issues may be made thereon.'' (See 
page 1094 of Pac. 270 of the Huntsville case). 
It was and is claimed by the plaintiffs, and appar-
ently the lower court has adopted that view, that the 
1.t 
l\IcCarty Decree places all of the parties on an equal 
priority. The McCarty Decree makes no pretense of 
settling the matter of priorities among the water users 
but sets out the proportions of water to which each party 
was entitled. From a reading of the McCarty Decree it 
is apparent the matter of priorities was not an issue, 
and this is understandable because in 1900 and for 
years prior thereto the matter of priorities was of lit-
tle importance, there being ample water, but in any 
event the decree indicates that the issue of priorities 
was not before the court. 
However, even if it be assumed that the McCarty 
Decree does place each of the parties on an equal pri-
ority basis, there is no reason to assume that thereafter 
such rights could not be changed by subsequent condi· 
tions, or by mutual consent, contract or otherwise. To 
assert that a right acquired long prior to 1900 must re· 
main the same in 1925 or 1931 is to assert something 
that is not true. Suffice it to say that as early as 1924, 
Orderville Irrigation Company, Mt. Carmel Irrigation 
Company and a number of others joined in an objection 
to the proposed determination requesting that the court 
in the general adjudication case treat their respectirr 
rights as these rights (so plaintiffs claim) had been ck 
termined by the McCarty Decree. Portions of the objec-
tions are quoted in .Judge Erickson's findings (Tr. 155) 
showing that the protestants requested a priority date 
of 1870, to be divided as provided in the ~,foCarty De-
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c:ree. The same finding recites that the court in the gen-
eral adjudication case, and after the filing of the objec-
tion by Judge Knox, made some changes and apparent 
corrections, such as increased period of time on all 
year's use, denying a request for increase of acreage, 
etc. (Tr. 155). Again in Hl30 a further petititon was 
filed referring to the .McCarty Decree and stressing only 
that they wished a right to the use of waters on the 
East Fork as a year around use in accordance with the 
McCarty Decree, but apparently did not again ref er to 
a change of priorities (Tr. 155-156). 
It is asserted by the defendants and found by .Judge 
Erickson that because the court in the Virgin River case 
refused to increase an acreage from 13.7 acres to 25.7 
acres, as requested in the petition, there is implication 
that the court intended to grant the petition giving all 
the rights a common priority date (Tr. 156). There is 
no substantial evidence-in fact no evidence-to sustain 
imch a finding. However, suffice it to say that each of 
the plaintiffs filed its and his water user's claim, that 
the priorities as so set up were adopted by the court in 
both the decrees of 1925 and 1931; that the plaintiffs 
protested the differences in the priority dates and ex-
pressly petitioned that all the rights be placed on a 
common priority; that plaintiffs were advised of the 
rontents of the final decree setting up the priority dates 
in accordance with their water users' claims; and that 
they did not see fit to appeal therefrom. Now, after a 
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span of over thirty or thirty-five years this action was 
commenced in an effort to amend and modify the decree. 
There is no rule more elementary than the rule of 
law that a former judgment becomes merged in a later 
judgment when the same issues are involved and the 
parties are the same. The former judgment has lost its 
validity and has expended its force and effect. Whether 
the Virgin River decree, when it became final, differs 
from the McCarty Decree upon which respondents rely, 
is now a matter of no concern to this Court. Assuming 
the Virgin River decree, insofar as it affects the rights 
of the respondents, could or would have been reversed 
upon a direct appeal-nevertheless it is now binding 
upon them. 
''Rights acquired by virtue of a judgment or 
decree (as claimed by respondents in 1900 under 
the l\[cCarty Decree) are liable to be terminated 
in the same manner. Consequently, though a mat-
ter has once been litigated to a final judgment, if 
it is subsequently relitigated and adjudicated, the 
last judgment controls and determines the rights 
of parties. The second judgment cannot be col-
laterally impeached by showing the first." Free-
man on Jud_qments, 5th Ed. Sec. 629, citing numer-
ous cases. 
The lower court m the case at bar recognized this 
principle of law, and has endeavored to circumvent the 
rule by finding that neither Judge Burton who signed 
and entered the 1925 decree, nor Judge Cox who sigiwrl 
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and entered the 1931 decree, ever intended to provide 
any priority date superior to any other priority date es-
tablished for a user on the East Fork of the Virgin 
River, and that these decrees must be interpreted to es-
tablish an equal priority date between plaintiffs and de-
fendant Glendale Irrigation Company (Tr. 159). 
It is a well settled rule of law that issues once 
raised in an action to which the parties in a later liti-
gation are the same and which issues are litigated by a 
court of competent jurisdiction, are subject to the rules 
of res judicata, and that the respective parties to such 
litigation are estopped from again raising those same 
issues in future litigation. This rule is so well settled 
that it seems idle to cite authorities. These rnles are 
set forth at length in Freeman on .Judgments, 5th Ed., 
Sec. 626 and 627. 
The rule of law and the cases go so far as to hold 
that even though the court was palpably in error by ap-
plying the law, the judgment when final cannot later be 
assailed. 
"By the rules of the civil as well as of the 
common law res judicata is not changed by a 
change in the form of action. It is not material 
that the form of action be the same, if the merits 
'vere tried on the first. A party cannot, by vary-
ing the form of action or adopting a different 
method of presenting his case, escape the opera-
tion of the principle that one and the same cause 
of action shall not be twice litigated." Sec. 684 
supra. 
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Sec also: 
Mathews vs. lllathews, 102 Utah 428, 132 Pac. 
2nd 111; 
State vs. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 Y?d 285; 
8ol011d L·s. Niclros, 79 Utah 381; 10 P2d 930. 
This court has had occasion to pass upon the relit-
igation of water rights once determined. The main sub-
ject of controversy in the case of Logan, Hyde Park & 
Smithfield Canal Co. L'S. Lapan City, 269 Pac. 777, 
72 Utah 221, was the superiority or priority of rights 
to the use of waters as between opposing sides. There 
the principal of contention of the appellants was that 
the trial court erroneously decided this question. The 
court held that as to what the parties contemplated, it 
might look no further than the pleadings (which in the 
general adjudication action was the filing of water users' 
claims and the State Engineer's proposed determina-
tion, if there was one) and the findings and judgment 
in this action. The court further stated ''these arc the 
things made res judicata by that decree and the legal 
effect of the adjudication is to forever bar any of the 
other parties- to the decree from asserting any ad,-ersc· 
claim to such rights.'' 
We believe that a case on all fours with the instant 
one is the case of Logan City L'S. Utah Power and Lz'.qld 
Co., 86 Utah 340; 16 P2d 1097. In that case a demurrer 
was interposed to the complaint on the gToumls "that 
the complaint shows on its face that all of the matters 
relied upon by plaintiff for its cause of action have been 
determined and adjudicated in two former suits" and 
"that the complaint fails to state facts sufficient to con-
stitute a case of action.'' The demurrer was sustained 
on both counts and the action was dismissed. On appeal 
this Court affirmed, It was there stated: 
''There are no maxims of the law more firm-
ly established, or of more value in the adminis-
tration of justice, than the two which are designed 
to prevent repeated litigation between the same 
parties in regard to the same subject of contro-
versy, namely, interest rei publicae, ut sit finis 
litium, and nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadam 
causa. If the court had been mistaken in the law, 
there is remedy by 'vrit of error. If the jury has 
been mistaken in the facts, the remedy is by mo-
tion for new trial. If there has been evidence dis-
covered since the trial a motion for new trial will 
give appropriate relief. But all these are parts of 
the same matter. So in a suit in chancery, on 
proper showing a rehearing is granted. If the in-
jury complained of is an erroneous decision, an 
appeal to a higher court gives opportunity to cor-
rect the error. If new evidence is discovered after 
the decree has become final, a bill of review on 
that ground may be filed within the rules pre-
scribed by law on that subject. Here, again, these 
proceedings are all part of the same suit, and the 
rule framed for the repose of society is not vio-
lated.'' 
In the case above cited Justice Elias Hansen has 
gone fully into the law concerning a relitigation of issues 
and conclndes ''the fact that the officers of the city 
misconceived the legal effect of the <lecree docs not af-
fect the finality thereof." It would serve no good pnr-
pose here to quote voluminously from that case since this 
Court is, without question, fully aware of its own de-
ClSlOll. 
On rehearing of the above Logan City case, cited in 
86 Utah 354, 44 P2d 6.98, this Court again announced the 
legal principle by stating: 
''In suit against city involving construction 
of decree entered in former suit, city might have 
litigated validity of decree, and where it did not 
do so, it would not attack such decree in a third 
suit.'' 
In the case of Frost vs. District Coitrt, 96 Utah 
106, 83 P2d 737, an attempt was m,ade to amend an es-
tablished water right. The decree so establishing a 
water right was made on November 14, 1932. A motion 
was then made to amend and modify the findings or 
make more certain matters relating to priority. The 
motion was denied and no appeal was taken. ]~our years 
later a motion was made to have the court amend and 
modify the decree to the extent of changing a priority 
date, by asserting that the change sought was a correc-
tion of a clerical error. A demurrer to the motion was 
made "that the court was without jurisdiction to amend 
the decree or correct the alleged clerical error; that the 
J'udo'ffient entered and filed in 1932 was a final judgwent . ,,.., 
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and that no appeal had been taken from that judgment." 
'l'he lower court allowed the modifications. On appeal 
this Court reversed and stated: 
''The court cannot under the guise of correct-
ing its record put upon it an order or judgment 
it never made or rendered, or add something to 
either which was not originally included, although 
it might and should have so ordered or -adjudged 
in the first instance. It cannot thus repair its own 
lapses and omissions to do what it could legally 
and properly have done at the right time. A 
court's mistake in leaving out of its derision some-
thing which it ought to have put in and something 
in lieu of which it intended but failed to dispose, 
is a judicial error, not a mere clerical misprision 
and cannot be corrected by adding to the entered 
judgment the omitted matter on the theory of mak-
ing the entry conform to the actual judgment." 
.Justice -Wolfe, in a concurring opinion states that 
"the inclusion of a priority date is something quite sub-
stantial and not clerical or minor" and that even retain-
ing jurisdiction by the court to correct errors does not 
include the changing of a priority clat0. 
What the plaintiffs in the instant case are trying to 
do is exactly what was attempted in the foregoing Frost 
case. Consider Finding No. 11 (Tr. lfJ9) wherein .Tudg0 
Erickson finds: 
"that if the Burton-Cox Decrees do purport 
to establish a higher priority date in the defendant 
Glendale Irrigation Company than in the other 
parties to this action, the 8ame is a result of an 
error or a clerical oversight and said decree should 
in equity and in good conscience be interpreted 
and construed so as to provide a common and equal 
priority date as bebveen all of the parties to this 
action.'' 
The Burton and Cox Decrees do actually and in 
clear and unambiguous language set up the respective 
priorities of the parties and the attack thereon is what 
the plaintiffs claim and the court finds "the same is a 
result of an errnr or a clerical oversight." The Frost 
case, never overruled or modified, disposes of plaintiffs' 
pm;ition in the instant case. As stated by J nstice Wolfe 
in the concurring decision in the Frost case, ''the inclu-
sion of a priority date is something quite substantial 
and not clerical or minor'' In the instant case the 
changing of a priority date is the sole thing attempted 
to be accomplished by plaintiffs. 
We conclude our argument on Point I by again say-
ing the plaintiffs or their predecessors very easily could 
have taken an appeal from that portion of the final de-
cree in the Virgin River general adjudication case af-
fecting their rights; and having been represented by 
competent counsel and having failed to do so, cannot 
thirty years or more later, under the guise of "inter-
preting the decree,'' materially alter and amend or mod-
ify the same. 
It is contended by this defendant that the plaintiffs 
cannot prevail upon their amended complaint, as show1i 
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by the allegations therein pleaded, because of latches. 
The plaintiffs have slept upon their alleged right to 
complain about the priorities of the respective parties 
as set up in the Virgin River decree. 'rhey made no 
complaint and took no steps for over thirty years to 
rectify the alleged failure of the court to follow the 1\Ic-
Carty Decree in the matter of priorities. 
It is a familiar rule that equity aids the vigilant, 
not those who slumber upon their rights. ·wholly inde-
pendent upon any statutory periods of limitation, equity 
discourages latches by making it a bar to relief and to 
prevent the enforcement of stale demands of all kinds. 
In Pomeroy on Equity Jurisprudence, 4th Ed. Vol 
1, Sec. 419, at page 785, it is stated: 
''A court of equity, which is never a_ctive in 
relief against conscience or public convenience has 
always refused its aid to stale demands where the 
party has slept upon his rights and acquiesced for 
a great length of time. Nothing can call forth 
this court into activity but conscience, good faith, 
and reasonable diligence." 
The criterion in all instances of this species 
is that the party had knowledge or information of 
certain matters in pais, which, although not direct-
ly tending to show the existence of a prior con-
flicting right, are sufficient to put him as a pru-
dent man, upon an inquiry; that he is charged 
with constructive notice of all that he might have 
learned by an inquiry prosecuted with reasonable 
diligence; a legal presumption arises that he has 
obtained information of what he might thus have 
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lcarne<l * •· * Pomeroy, supra, Vol. 2, Sec. 610, 
page 11.55. 
Equity will not permit him to stand by and 
permit the other party who holds the legal title, 
to improve and develop the property until it has 
become valuable or greatly increased in value and 
then assert his right * * * \Vhere important evi-
dence in behalf of the defendant has been lost dur-
ing the delay of the complainant, he will generally 
be barred from all relief. The loss may result 
from the deatll or incapacity of some of the wit-
nesses. Again, the delay may be so long that un-
der the circumstances many of the important facts 
have become obscured. To allow a complainant re-
lief in such cases ·would frequently risk a great 
hardship to innocent parties and consequently the 
courts decline to interfere. Pomeroy, supra, 4th 
Vol., Sec. 1443, Page 8424-5. 
Defendants contend that after this long lapse of 
time the individuals who had the most knowledge of the 
circumstances surrounding the claim of equal priorities 
are not now available. The state engineer has not main-
tained as complete a record of the distribution of water 
as could have been done to establish whether or not the 
waters of the East Fork of the Virgin River were dis-
tributed as now claimed by plaintiffs. The age and rec-
ollection of the important witness, Marcellus Johnson, 
upon whom plaintiffs rely as to distribution of water in 
the early years, leaves much to be desired concerni11g-
certainty of his testimony. Attorneys representing the 
parties, including plaintiffs' mm counsel Judge Knox. 
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and the Judges Burton and Cox before whom the objec-
tions of plaintiffs were presented, are no longer avail-
able. To say the least, the proof which defendants may 
have found available some years ago, in order to dispute 
the plaintiffs' present claims concerning the matter of 
priorities have long since been lost. As a matter of 
equity, the doctrine of latches should now he invoked 
against the plaintiffs. 
The necessity for invoking· the doctrine of "latches" 
in favor of defendants and against the plaintiffs, and the 
unfair position in which the defendants now find them-
selves is illustrated by portions of the findin~s upon 
which plaintiffs rely to sustain their position. 
Finding No. 10, last paragraph (Tr. 159) reciteH: 
''The court therefore finds that neither the 
Burton Decree nor the Cox Decree provides or 
was ever intended to proride any priority dates 
superior to any other priority date established for 
a user on the East Fork of the Virgin Rinr." 
Again in Finding No. 11, first paragraph (Tr. 159) 
we find the following recitation: 
''That the Burton-Cox Decree icas never in-
tended to establish other than equal or common 
priority dates between plaintiffs and defendants 
in this action; that if the Burton-Cox Decrees 
do purport to establish a higher priority date in 
the defendant Glendale Irrigation Company than 
in the other parties to this action, then the same 
is a result of an error or a clerical oversight; that 
the parties thrmselves havr placed a contempora-
neous and practical construction upon the terms 
and meaning of the Burton-Cox Decrees so as to 
provide an equal priority date for all of plaintiffs 
and defendants and the users on the East _F'ork of 
the Virgin River have been in accordance with the 
interpretation and construction placed thereon bv 
all of th(· users of water.'' · 
-Whether or not the above findings can be support-
ed by the evidence can be of paramount importance in 
this case. Had the issues now before the court been 
raised in a case filed within a reasonable period after 
the entry of the 1931 Cox Decree, both Judges Burton 
and Cox, Attorney Knox, and many of the water users 
were alive, and the matter of what was intended could 
have been determined by these witnesses and not now 
left to mere conjecture. 
·we call attention to Finding No. 5 (Tr. 155) con-
cerning filing of objections by Attorney Knox, and cer-
tain comments of the then Judge. Judge Erickson finds 
that the denial by the then Judge of a right to increased 
acreage implies that such court intended to grant the 
petition insofar as it sought to change the period of use, 
and provide common priority dates. Now that Judges 
Burton and Cox are no longer available to testify as to 
what they intended or what was implied, Judge Erick-
son's finding is a mere guess and the defendants at this 
late date find it impossible to meet this issue. 
The abo,'e are only a few illustrations of the un-
fair position with which the defendants arc• now con-
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fronted-all of which could have been avoided had a 
timely action been instituted. 
Defendants believe and assert that their motion for 
summary judgment should be granted for the reason the 
action of plaintiffs is barred by limitations. 
Limitations of Actions. (within three years). 
Sec. 78-12-26(3) U.C.A. 1953. An action for re-
lief on the ground of fraud or mistake ; but the 
cause of action on such ground shall not be deemed 
to have accrued until the discovery by the ag-
grieved party of the facts constituting the mistake. 
A mere reading of the decree shows the dates of 
priority assigned to each water user. This constitutes 
actual notice. If the plaintiffs or any one of them had 
any complaint concerning defendant Glendale Irrigation 
Company's superior priority, and felt that a suit such 
as the instant one, after the time to appeal had expired, 
was proper, then such action should have been com-
menced within three years after the receipt of a copy 
of the general adjudication decree. 
8a. 78-12-25(2). (Within four years). 
An action for relief not otherwise provided 
h:v law. 
In the event Sec. 78-12-26 is held not applicable, then 
surely this catch-all Sec. 78-12-2.5 should be held 
applicable. The complaint of plaintiffs, when read as 
a whole, clearly states a factual situation of which the 
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plaintiffs were aware since the entry of the Virgin River 
final decree in 1931. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PLAIN-
TIFFS' MOTION FOR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
It \Yould seem unnecessary to argue that if the de-
fendants' motion for a summary judgment should have 
been granted, then it was error for the lower court to 
have granted the plaintiffs' motion for a summary judg-
ment. In this case, if it be decided that plaintiffs' right 
to relief is barr('d because of res judicata, latches, lim-
itations, or any one of the affirmative defenses pleaded 
in the defendants' answers, then of course the summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiffs ought not to be granted. 
To sustain a summary judgment, pleadings, 
evidence, admissions and inferences therefrom 
viewed most fa11orably to loser must show that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that 
winner is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Rules of Ui1:il Procednrr,, R1tle 56( c). Frederick 
May & Co. i:s. Dwin, 13 Utah 2d 40; 368 P2d 266. 
Bitlloch vs. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, 11 Utah 
2d 1; 354 P2d 559. In re Williams' Estate, 10 Utah 
2d 83, 34R P2d 68.'l. 
Defendant was not entitled to grant of its 
motion for summary judgment although such a 
motion was supported by affidavits and exhibits 
and no counter-affidavits were filed by plaintiff, 
where allegations in plaintiff's complaint stood iu 
opposition to averments of the affidavits tbuR 
ra1smg controverted issues of fact. Christensen 
vs. Financial Service Co., 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P2d 
1010. 
In the foregoing Christensen case the party moving 
for summary judgment claimed entitlement thereto be-
cause its motion was supported by affidavits and exhib-
its, whereas no counter-affidavits were filed by plaintiff. 
This Court held ''that a summary judgment can proper-
ly be granted under Rule 56 ( c) only if the pleadings, dep-
ositions and admissions on file, together ·with affidavits, 
if any, which are offered show without dispute that the 
party is entitled to prevail. This condition is obviously 
not met if the allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint 
stand in opposition to the averments of the affidavits 
so that there are controverted issues of fact, the deter-
mination of which is necessary to settle the rights of 
the partieB." 
Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleges factual situa-
tions, as well as pleading conclusions of law. Each and 
every factual situation alleged has been denied by the 
answers of the defendant Glendale Irrigation Company 
1111d the State Engineer. 
True, the lower court has made findings and stated 
conclusions, which if sustained by a preponderance of 
competent evidence at a trial, might support a judg-
ment. In making this statement, appellants do not wish 
to be understood as waiving their positions as otherwise 
in this brief set forth, or as admitting that such posi-
tions are not tenable. 
Defendants should have the right to produce wit-
nesses in opposition to the allegations of the amended 
complaint and to support its denials. 'rhe State Engineer 
should have the right at a trial to show by his records, 
both written and otherwise, if any such exist, that the 
distribution of water during the past number of years 
was not as claimed by plaintiffs, without regard to pri-
orities. Paragraph 8 of the amended complaint (Tr. 
28) precludes the plaintiffs' right to a summary decree 
because such allegations are in direct conflict with par-
agraph 6 of the amended complaint (Tr. 27-38). In 
paragraph 6 it is alleged that the McCarty Decree as to 
its provision for priority dates ''Has been administered, 
followed and observed in, and the same has controlled 
and continuously been controlling, the administration 
and distribution of all of the waters of the East Fork 
from the date of its entry to and including the present 
time and in each and every year since its entry, regard-
less of amount of water available in the East "F'ork and 
its tributaries, the McCarty Decree has as to its priority 
dates been applied and been exclusively the governing 
instrument in administering and distributing all of the 
waters of the East Fork." Paragraph 8 alleges "that 
as a result of some language in the Burton and Cox 
Decrees the defendant Glendale Irrigation Company 
contends, and the defendant State Engineer has ruled 
and so administered the stream, that the clef endant Glen-
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<lale Irr. Co. has been awarded a priority date superior 
to and earlier than those priority dates of plaintiff, and 
when there is not sufficient water available in the East 
:B1 ork to fill the respective rights in quantity that Glen-
dale's decreed rights must be filled before any others 
are furnished water.'' 
Based upon this admission in plaintiffs' complaint, 
it ·would not be entitled to summary judgment. 
The trial court was not entitled to accept every 
statement in the depositions of plaintiffs' witnesses as 
true and on the basis thereof, summarily render judg-
ment against defendants, since the defendants were and 
are entitled to cross-examination of these witnesses when 
produced at a trial, and were and are entitled to produce 
witnesses, exhibits and whatever eYidence is still avail-
aule in support of their denials as set forth in their 
respective answers and in opposition to the allegations 
of the plaintiffs' complaint. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT DISQUALIFYING HIM-
SELF UPON THE FILING OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
BIAS AND PREJUDICE AND THE CERTIFICATION 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF. 
'rhe affidavit made by a director of the defendant 
Glendale Irrigation Company (Tr. 64-5) recites that the 
Hon. Ferdinand Erickson is and should be disqualified 
from proceeding with the trial because of bias and prej-
0 
udice against the defendant and m favor of the plain-
tiffs ; that as reasons for his belief is the fact that said 
Judge has on several occasions expressed himself as 
feeling this case should not be tried and should be set-
tled; that said Judge upon an occasion during the month 
of February, 1963, (after at least one or perhaps two 
pre-trial sessions) at Orderville, met with individuals, 
both plaintiffs and defendants, and expressed himself 
as feeling that the plaintiffs should prevail, that the 
Burton Decree does not accord to the defendant corpor-
ation any priority in the right to water over any prior-
ities of plaintiffs. As viewed by the Judge, that ques-
tion of priorities is extremely important in the case be-
fore him-in fact it is the important issue. The Judge 
having expressed an opinion that the plaintiffs should 
prevail, and evidently having his mind made up to that 
fact, justified the defendant in believing that the case 
was pre-judged. ·when it appeared that the Judge had 
already made up his mind, after pre-trial hearings, and 
before according the defendant irrigation company and 
the State Engineer their day in court, that the plain-
tiffs should prevail, gave the defendant irrigation com-
pany considerable concern; and the failure of the Court 
to disqualify himself under the circumstance§ does not 
appeal to this defendant as fair dealing or according to 
lt the right of a fair and unbiased trial. 
The fact that the summary judgment was granted 
under the circumstances and record of this case, and 
the manifest intention of the Judge to continue with the 
case lends credence to the fact that the case was pre-
judged as set forth in the affidavit. 
"\Ve are fully aware of the holding of this Court in 
the following cases : 
Haslam vs. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 1.90 P2d 520; 
State vs. Byington, 114 Utah 388, 200 P2d 723. 
However, in both of these cases this Court has in-
dicated strongly that it does not feel inclined to approve 
a judge insisting upon presiding at a trial when his bias 
and prejudice has been asserted in an affidavit of bias 
and prejudice. It was said in the Haslam case : 
The general practice in this jurisdiction has 
been for judges to disqualify themselves whenever 
an affidavit of bias and prejudice against them 
has been filed. As a general rule we think this 
is a commendable practice. The purity and in-
tegrity of the judicial process ought to be protect-
ed against any taint of suspicion to the end that 
the public and litigants may have the highest con-
fidence in the integrity and fairness of the courts. 
'" * * It is ordinarily better for a judge to disqual-
ify himself eve_n though he may be entirely free 
of bias and prejudice if either litigant files an 
affidavit of bias and prejudice. Next in impor-
tance to the duty of rendering· a righteous judg-
ment is that of doing it in such a manner as will 
beget no suspicion of the fairness or integrity of 
the judge. 
.J uclge \:V acle has this to say in the same case: 
'' F'ew cases have come to the attention of this 
court where a district judge has refused to make 
a transfer upon application of a litigant. This i~ 
due largely to what I think is an almost universal 
practice in this state for district judges to get an-
other judge even on the mere suggestion of a party 
litigant that the judge '.Vas biased or prejudiced. 
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This I consider a highly desirable practice and I 
believe that such a practice has a very strong ten-
dency to forestall and prevent any desire on the 
part of litigants to ask for a change of judge in 
bad faith." 
Under the circumstances set forth in the affidavit 
the defendant irrigation company cannot be charged with 
acting in bad faith in applying· for a change of judge. 
The lang·uage used by Justice vVade in the Bying-
ton case applies equally in this case. The language re-
ferred to is stated thusly: 
''While defendant must establish actual bias 
and prejudice and that the existence or non-exist-
ence of these elements must, in the first instance, 
be determined by the trial judge, nevertheless, the 
acts, conduct and pronouncement of the judge, 
overwhelmingly preponderate against his finding 
that hr was unbiased and unprejudiced." 
POINT IV 
Subdivsion A. THAT THE ANSWERS TO THE INTER· 
ROGATORIES AND THE DEPOSITIONS, TOGETHER 
WITH THE EXHIBITS ADMITTED AND RECEIVED 
IN EVIDENCE DO NOT JUSTIFY THE GRANTING 
OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE 
PLAINTIFFS. 
Subdivision B. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING 
ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND THAT THE PLEADINGS, ANSWERS ".l'O 
INTERROGATORIES AND THE DEPOSITIONS DO 
NOT SUPPORT SUCH FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Subdivision C. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING 
AND ENTERING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
DECREE IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS. 
Appellants will discuss all of these subdivisions to-
gether, since they are so interrelated that it would be 
difficult to segregate and discuss them separately. 
vV c submit that even a casual reading of the depo-
sitions of the three witnesses whose depositions were 
taken by plaintiffs, do not show any positiveness upou 
the part of any one of them concerning how the water 
was administered and distributed from 1931 to 1961. 
Their lmowledge of the distribution of water is vague 
and without any foundation. None of the witnesses kept 
any records, made any measurements, do not specify 
when or in what degree water was distributed to Glen-
dale Irrigation Company. To disturb a decreed right 
should require a preponderance of competent evidence, 
not a vague recollection. Moreover, the testimony, at 
that stage of the proceeding, without a trial in which 
the defendants would be given the opportunity to make 
a showino· of actual distribution methods, does not jus-o 
tify the granting of the summary judgment. 
·we submit also that findings of fact based upon 
the intent of judges, one of whom is now deceased and 
the other unavailable, and who entered the decrees thirty 
and thirty-five years ago, cannot be sustained. 
The findings include many conclusions that cannot 
be sustained. F'or example, Finding No. 4 (Tr. 154) 
''that the effect of the McCarty Decree was to establish 
equal priority dates between the parties" when the issue 
of priorities was not then before the court in the Mc-
Carty case, is not a finding but a conclusion not support-
ed by any proper finding. 
The Finding No. 5 (Tr. 154) that the objections or 
protests of the proposed determination of the State En-
gineer in its priority awards "by subsequent orders, 
rulings and actions of the court were in fact approved 
and granted" cannot be sustained as based upon evi-
dence. Such a finding is based only upon implication 
and second guessing. 
Finding No. 6 (Tr. 156) cannot be sustained as based 
upon competent proof, either by the depositions, exhibits 
or otherwise. 
In an effort to bolster up the findings to support 
the summary judgment and decree it is recited (Tr 155, 
Finding No. fi, page 4 of said findings), that Judge 
Knox, who appeared as counsel for the Orderville, Mt. 
Carmel and Glendale Irrigation . Companies, filed objec-
tions on behalf of protestants, objecting to the different 
.. -,)/ 
priority dates. These objections were not prepared and 
filed by Judge Knox but prepared by individuals in De-
cember, 1924, before the Burton Decree was entered on 
December 12, 1925 (Tr. 137-8). Thereafter, and before 
the entry of the Cox Decree in April, 1931, and on De-
cember 11th, 1930, a protest was prepared and filed by 
Judge Knox for a number of protestants (pages 24-5-6 
of the original adjudication files marked 1930-1934). 
These objections referred to water user's claims 1 to 
30B. The objectors claimed a year-round use of water 
as provided by the McCarty Decree, and asked for an 
increase of acreage for one individual. The prayer 
asks that the 1925 Burton Decree previously made b<' 
modified ''and when a final decree is entered they be 
awarded all the waters during the C'ntire year." These 
objections malcc no mention wliatsoever to any change 
of priorities as set forth in the previous Burton Decree. 
It is thus seen that any and all recitals in Judge 
Erickson's findings in the case at bar which imply that 
the plaintiffs in 1930 and shortly prior to the final Cox 
Decree of 1931 objected to the different priority dates, 
or contended that the McCarty Decree placed all water 
users on an equal priority basis, are in error and abso-
lutely untrue. The fact is that plaintiffs and/or their 
respective predecessors in interest made no such claim, 
and so far as the record discloses, were satisfied with 
the priorities set forth in the previous Burton Decree. 
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Findings Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 (Tr. 156-159) have 
no foundation but are based upon conjecture, mere con-
clusions and unsupported by any competent proof. 
It necessarily follows that the conclusions of law 
that are not supported by adequate and appropriate find-
ings cannot be sustained. It follows also that the sum-
mary decree (Tr. 161-163) in effect vacating that portion 
of the Burton-Cox Decrees setting up respective prior-
ities of the parties litigant herein, and substituting a 
different set of priorities, cannot be sustained. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE 
STATE ENGINEER TO DISTRIBUTE THE WATERS 
OF THE EAST FORK OF THE VIRGIN RIVER IN AC· 
CORDANCE WITH THE McCARTY DECREE AND 
NOT THE BARTON -COX DECREES. 
We have in the McCarty Decree a decision which 
confirms diligence rights for both parties, but fails to 
define the elements of the individual rights. This decree 
is completely silent on the ·subject of priorities and, as 
we have previously noted, it cannot be construed as de-
ciding· the rights between the parties by implication, 
Sharp vs. Whitmore, 5-1 Utah -14, -168 Pac. 273 (1917). 
On the other hand, the general adjudication statute spe-
cifically provides the procedure for the resolution and 
determination of all questions of appropriation and 
priority from the stream being adjudicated. The indi-
vidual users make their own declaration of the priority 
of the right which they claim, Section 78-4-5, U.C.A. 1958. 
This Court has made it clear that the user must file his 
claim and have his right incorporated in the final ad-
judication decree whether or not it has been previously 
decreed: 
''The procedure upon a general determination, 
after it has been initiated, is the same wliether the 
action be commenced under the one section or the 
other. In either case the state engineer makes 
his surveys, investigations, and reports any pro-
posed determination; he distributes the waters 
until the final decree in the same manner, paying 
due regard to the rights which have been estab-
lished by decrees. All persons claiming rights in 
the system, whether the same be decreed or not, 
are required to come in and fi_le statements of 
their claims. The statements stand in the place 
of pleadings, and issues may be joined thereon. 
Mammoth Canal & Irrigation Co. v. Burton, 70 
Utah 23.9, 259 Pnc. 408 (1.9!27) 
Also see Eden Irr. Co. v. District Court, 61 Utah 
103, 211 Pac. 957 (1922) and Smith v. Dist. Court of 211d 
Dist. of Morgan Co., 69 Utah 493, 256 Pac 589 (19/27) 
The priority of the right awarded must be set forth in 
the final judgment, Section 73-4-12, U.C.A. 195.'J. 'l'his 
Court has stated those elements specified by the statute 
must be contained in the findings of the court, Plai1t 
City Irr. Co. r. Hooper Irr. Co., 87 Utah .145, 51 P. 
(2d) 1069 (1.935). 
The adjudication statute reco~nizC's that pr10r de-
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crees must be incorporated into the final decree of these 
proceedings. Section 73-4-11, U.C.A., 1953, provides that 
after the proposed determination has been prepared and 
served on the parties : 
''The State Engineer shall distribute the wat-
ers from the natural streams or other natural 
sources in accordance with the proposed determi-
nation or modification thereof by court order 
until a final decree is rendered by the court; pro-
vided, if the right to the use of said water has 
been theretofore decreed or adjudicated said wat-
ers shall be distributed in accordance with such 
decree until the same is reversed, modified, vacat-
ed or otherwise legally set aside.'' 
It is clear that these prior decrees are merged into 
the final adjudication decree. There can be no other 
interpretation. Any other result would circumvent the 
very purpose of the statute in setting forth all the rights 
on a source in one judgment. Certainly the plaintiffs 
knew the implication of the respective priorities for the 
various users from this stream. If this was not clear 
from the specific awards themselves, the Burton De-
cree certainly left no doubt when recited in the gen-
eral provisions that: 
"When there is not sufficient water in the 
Virgin River and its tributaries to supply all the 
rights hereby decreed, the available water shall 
be distributed to the various appropriators in ac-
cordance with their respective priori ties as herein 
fixed, and no appropriator, except as specified 
herein, shall be entitled to divert and use water 
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hereunder for any purpose until said prior ap-
propriators shall have been satisfied in full. 
Where there are several rights of equal priority 
and there is not enough water to supply all the 
rights having such priority, the available water 
shall be prorated in the proportion which the 
quantity to which they are entitled bears to the 
entire flow available to the rights of the priority 
in question.'' 
This declaration leaves no question as to how the 
waters are to be distributed to these users and makes 
the ruling of the trial court in this matter entirely with-
out foundation. 
The record fails to show any distribution program 
between these parties in the early years. This would 
seem to indicate that there was no necessity for a full 
time water commissioner until recent years. In both 
1956 (Tr. 59) and 1961 (Tr. 40) when the question was 
raised the State Engineer ruled that he was bound 
to follow the provisions of the Burton-Cox Decrees and 
the commissioner was to distribute the water according 
to the clear and specific directions of these decrees. \Ve 
submit there will be nothing but chaos and confusion in 
the administration of water rights if every dissatisfied 
user is allowed to go behind the adjudication decrees in 
order to obtain an additional water right. If the State 
Engineer, in carrying out his responsibilities in the ad-
ministration and distribution of water under court de-
crees, Section 73-5-3, U.C.A., 1.953, cannot rely on a 
general adjudication decree, he has no basis for settin"' 
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up a distribution program. It is the duty of the engi-
neer to strictly comply with the provisions of the final 
decree on a stream in distributing the water to the 
users. Caldwell v. Erickson, 61 Utah 265, 213 Pac. 182 
(1923). 
CONCLUSION 
The respondents, under the guise of asking for an 
interpretation and construing of decrees made and en-
tered in 1925 and 1931, and from which no appeal wa~ 
taken, are seeking to have established for them priorities 
of water rights other and more favorable than as es-
tablished in such decrees. 
We cannot overlook or agree with the court's find-
ing (Tr. 159) which declares "that if the Burton-Cox 
Decrees do purpo_rt to establish a higher priority date 
in the defendant Glendale Irr. Co. than in the other 
parties to this action, the same is a result of an error 
or clerical oversight and said decree should in equity 
and good conscience be interpreted and construed so as 
to provide a common and equal priority date as be-
tween all the parties to this action.'' 
The legal effect of the summary judgment and de-
cree is not to interpret and construe the prior decrccR, 
which are not in any way ambiguous or uncertain, but 
to vacate portions thereof and materially enlarge upon 
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respondents' priorities, and to the same degree delete 
an<l diminish Glendale Irrigation Company's priority 
and the water rights of its numerous stockholders. If 
this can be done, the value of any general adjudication 
decree will be destroyed and its purpose and finality 
set at naught. 
\Ve conclude, therefore, that the summary jndgment 
and decree should be reversed and the case remanded to 
the District Court of the Sixth .r udicial District in and 
for Kane County, Utah, with specific instructions to 
rnter a summary judgment in favor of defendants, or to 
imstain the affirmative defenses pleaded b~' defendant 
irrigation company and dismiss the action: or in the 
ennt this Honorable Court should determine that the 
affirmative defenses are unavailing, and that the action 
should not be summarily dismissed, then to remand this 
case with instructions to the lower court to proceed with 
a trial of the cause. 
Resprctfully 8ubmittrd, 
CLINE AND .JACKSOX 
By SAM C'LrnE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Glendale Irrigation Company 
ThLLIN w. ,JEN BEN 
Attorney for StatP En.r1inePr 
TV aynr D. ('riddle. 
